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The productivity paradox was analyzed and popularized in a widely cited article by Erik Brynjolfsson, which noted the apparent contradiction between the remarkable advances in computer power and the relatively slow growth of productivity at the level of the whole economy, individual firms and many specific applications. The concept is sometimes referred to as the Solow computer paradox in reference to Robert Solow's 1987 quip, "You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics."〔Robert Solow, "We'd better watch out", New York Times Book Review, July 12, 1987, page 36. See (here ).〕 The paradox has been defined as the “discrepancy between measures of investment in information technology and measures of output at the national level.” It was widely believed that office automation was boosting labor productivity (or total factor productivity). However, the growth accounts didn't seem to confirm the idea. From the early 1970s to the early 1990s there was a massive slow-down in growth as the machines were becoming ubiquitous. (Other variables in countries' economies were changing simultaneously; growth accounting separates out the improvement in production output using the same capital and labour resources as input by calculating growth in total factor productivity, AKA the "Solow residual".) The productivity paradox has attracted a lot of attention because technology seems no longer to be able to create the kind of productivity gains that occurred until the early 1970s. Some, such as economist Robert J. Gordon, are now arguing that technology in general is subject to diminishing returns in its ability to increase economic growth. Explanations Several authors have explained the paradox in different ways. In his original article, Brynjolfsson (1993) identified four categories to group the various explanations proposed: # Mismeasurement of outputs and inputs, # Lags due to learning and adjustment, # Redistribution and dissipation of profits, and # Mismanagement of information and technology. He explained the first two explanations as "shortcomings in research, not practice as the root of the productivity paradox." He then stated that "a more pessimistic view is embodied in the other two explanations. They propose that there really are no major benefits".〔 Brynjolfsson explores these ideas in detail and poses the paradox as an economic problem: Do benefits justify past and continued investment in information technology?〔 Turban, et al. (2008), state that understanding the paradox requires an understanding of the concept of productivity.〔 Pinsonneault et al. (1998) state that, to untangle the paradox, an “understanding of how IT usage is related to the nature of managerial work and the context in which it is deployed” is required.〔Pinsonneault et al., pp. 287–311〕 One hypothesis to explain the productivity paradox is that computers are productive, yet their productive gains are realized only after a lag period, during which complementary capital investments must be developed to allow for the use of computers to their full potential.〔David P.A., "The Dynamo and the Computer: A Historical Perspective on the Modern Productivity Paradox", American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 1990, 355–61〕 Diminishing marginal returns from computers, the opposite of the time lag hypothesis, is that computers, in the form of mainframes, were used in the most productive areas, like high volume transactions of banking, accounting and airline reservations, over two decades before personal computers. Also, computers replaced a sophisticated system of data processing that used unit record equipment. Therefore the important productivity opportunities were exhausted before computers were everywhere. We were looking at the wrong time period. Another hypothesis states that computers are simply not very productivity enhancing because they require time, a scarce complementary human input. This theory holds that although computers perform a variety of tasks, these tasks are not done in any particularly new or efficient manner, but rather they are only done faster. Current data does not confirm the validity of either hypothesis. It could very well be that increases in productivity due to computers are not captured in GDP measures, but rather in quality changes and new products. Economists have done research in the productivity issue and concluded that there are three possible explanations for the paradox. The explanations can be divided in three categories: * Data and analytical problems hide "productivity-revenues". The ratios for input and output are sometimes difficult to measure, especially in the service sector. * Revenues gained by a company through productivity will be hard to notice because there might be losses in other divisions/departments of the company. So it is again hard to measure the profits made only through investments in productivity. * There is complexity in designing, administering and maintaining IT systems. IT projects, especially software development, are notorious for cost overruns and schedule delays. Adding to cost are rapid obsolescence of equipment and software, incompatible software and network platforms and issues with security such as data theft and viruses. This causes constant spending for replacement. One time changes also occur, such as the Year 2000 problem and the changeover from Novell NetWare by many companies. Other economists have made a more controversial charge against the utility of computers: that they pale into insignificance as a source of productivity advantage when compared to the industrial revolution, electrification, infrastructures (canals and waterways, railroads, highway system), Fordist mass production and the replacement of human and animal power with machines. High productivity growth occurred from last decades of the 19th century until the 1973, with a peak from 1929 to 1973, then declined to levels of the early 19th century. 〔 There was a rebound in productivity after 2000. Much of the productivity from 1985 to 2000 came in the computer and related industries. A number of explanations of this have been advanced, including: # The tendency – at least initially – of computer technology to be used for applications that have little impact on overall productivity, e.g. word processing. # Inefficiencies arising from running manual paper-based and computer-based processes in parallel, requiring two separate sets of activities and human effort to mediate between them – usually considered a technology alignment problem # Poor user interfaces that confuse users, prevent or slow access to time-saving facilities, are internally inconsistent both with each other and with terms used in work processes – a concern addressed in part by enterprise taxonomy # Extremely poor hardware and related boot image control standards that forced users into endless "fixes" as operating systems and applications clashed – addressed in part by single board computers and simpler more automated re-install procedures, and the rise of software specifically to solve this problem, e.g. Norton Ghost # Technology-driven change driven by companies such as Microsoft which profit directly from more rapid "upgrades" # An emphasis on presentation technology and even persuasion technology such as PowerPoint, at the direct expense of core business processes and learning – addressed in some companies including IBM and Sun Microsystems by creating a PowerPoint-Free Zone # The blind assumption that introducing new technology must be good # The fact that computers handle office functions that, in most cases, are not related to the actual production of goods and services. # Factories were automated decades before computers. Adding computer control to existing factories resulted in only slight productivity gains in most cases. ==Effects of economic sector share changes== Gordon J. Bjork points out that manufacturing productivity gains continued, although at a decreasing rate than in decades past; however, the cost reductions in manufacturing shrank the sector size. The services and government sectors, where productivity growth is very low, gained in share, dragging down the overall productivity number. Because government services are priced at cost with no value added, government productivity growth is near zero as an artifact of the way in which it is measured. Bjork also points out that manufacturing uses more capital per unit of output than government or services.〔 〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「productivity paradox」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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